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Article 12

APPORTIONMENT PROBLEMS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
I. Introduction
American urban areas are beset by many and varied problems. They have
not been solved largely because of the inability of inefficient and haphazard
clusters of governments to develop and apply area-wide programs.' Thus, consolidation and reorganization have been sought. The inefficiency of the many
controlling bodies is largely the result of historical development wherein small
communities have outgrown and made functionally useless boundaries to which
political adherence is still found. Even so, political autonomy is part of the social
climate of each community and is valued by many of the residents. In today's
metropolitan society with huge impersonal bureaucracies, a local government
that is parochial gives the constituents an important feeling of political efficacy.
Many localities have rejected the idea of consolidation, or at a minimum, have
bargained for some measure of autonomy. Additionally, suburbanites often express fear of an urban majority and maintain they must have equal representation
as a "community." Quite often in consolidations of past years those demands
have been met by districting along "community" boundaries and assigning to
each a representative. As a rule, however, these districts have been made up
of greatly varying populations, causing malapportionment.
Litigation dealing with local apportionment has been plentiful. Many
voters have claimed that by living in more populous districts their votes are unconstitutionally debased.2 As a result, the Supreme Court has applied the equal3
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to local government elections.
While decisions of the past few years appear conceptually conflicting, a general
trend can be perceived.
II. Judicial Approach to Voter Apportionment
In 1962 in Baker v. Carr4 the Court held that a voter's challenge of an
apportionment statute was justiciable, thus making it clear that a federal court
had the power to determine whether such a statute is valid. No firm standards
were articulated, however, and it was implied that a state legislative apportionment scheme had only to meet the test of minimum rationality. s If this were
true, then as Justice Frankfurter charged in his dissent, the Court was indulging
"in mere empty rhetoric, sounding a promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing
to the hope."6 Two years later the implication proved incorrect; in Reynolds v.
1 See

COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METRO-

POLITAN AREAS

(1970).

2 It is questionable whether local government units as they are often formulated could be
responsive to the needs of the people. It has been noted that malapportionment on the local
level is more severe than it was on the state level, and that government stagnation is more rank
than it has ever been on the state level. McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36
GEO.WASH. L. Rav. 713. 713-14 (1968).
3 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).

4 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

5 Mr. Justice Brennan wrote that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary
and capricious action. Id. at 226. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 968, 970 (1963).

6 369 U.S. at 270.
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Sims 7 the Court declared that a qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote
in elections for state legislators without having his vote wrongly diluted or debased.' It was held that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause demands no less than
substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places
as well as races." 9 Following Reynolds many lower courts extended the "one
man, one vote" principle to local levels of government."0 In 1968 the Supreme
Court followed suit in Avery v. Midland County," holding that since local governments are an exercise of state power through subordinate agencies, unequal
districting within them is violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The fear expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Avery, that
the determination would have "undesirable 'freezing' effects on local government,"' 3 is shared by others.' 4 It is clear that these critics have rejected the basic
underlying value defined in Baker and implemented in Reynolds-that apportionment according to population is a basic principle of representation in a
political democracy." In recognition that such a principle is not the only permissible basis for political representation, Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in
Baker maintained that the Court ought not ". . . choose among competing bases
of representation-ultimately, really, among competing theories of political
philosophy...""
It was the belief of Justices Harlan and Stewart that representatives in
government ought to represent groups and interests.' The primary problem
7 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
8 Id. at 579.
9 Id. at 568.
10 One man, one vote was applied to city councils. E.g., Kapral v. Jepson, 271 F. Supp.
74 (D. Conn. 1967); Newbold v. Osser, 425 Pa. 478, 230 A.2d 54 (1967). It was also applied
to county boards. E.g., Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Miss. 1966); Montgomery
County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164 (1966).
11 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
12 Id. at 479, 484-85.
13 Id. at 492-95.
14 See, e.g., Martin, Local Reapportionment,47 J. URBAN L. 345, 352 (1969-70).
15 377 U.S. at 565.
16 369 U.S. at 300.
17 Justice Harlan made his position clear dissenting in Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 623-24.
It is surely . . . obvious, and, in the context of elections, more meaningful to note
that people are not ciphers and that legislators can represent their electors only by
speaking for their interests- economic, social, political - many of which do reflect
the place where the electors live. The Court does not establish, or indeed even attempt to make a case for the proposition that conflicting interests within a state
can only be adjusted by disregarding them when voters are grouped for purposes of
representation.
Justice Stewart explained his theory of representation in his dissent in Lucas v. Colorado
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749-51 (1964).
Representative government is a process of accommodating group interests
through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function is to channel the numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the people of a State into the making of the
State's public policy. Appropriate legislative apportionment, therefore, should ideally
be designed to insure effective representation in the State's legislature, in cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various groups and interests making
up the electorate .... [Legislators] represent people, or, more accurately, a majority
of the voters in their districts-people with identifiable needs and interests which
. . . can often be related to the geographical areas in which these people live. The
very fact of geographic districting, the constitutional validity of which the Court
does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional needs and interests ....
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with this approach is identifying the interests around which people are to be
grouped. Our electoral system is organized on the basis of geography. Although
Harlan and Stewart appear to accept geographic districting, they never reconcile
territorial constituency with their preference for interest representation. Actually,
each legislative district has within it groups of various and conflicting economic
and social needs. Furthermore, few voters can identify their interests with groups
wholly within a single district. Even if some district-wide desires can be found,
it cannot be assumed they transcend others in importance. It is clear interests
are too diverse in even a small area for an elected official of any general purpose
government to represent a defined interest group. Ultimately he represents unique
persons who have various and often conflicting group pressures influencing
their voting. It is more consistent with the American political scheme to say
that the basis of pluralistic thought is not interest representation within the policy
making branch of government, but rather interest groups making known their

desires upon policy makers selected by people.' 8
This is not to say that in districting political subdivision lines ought not to be
taken into account. Certainly, inhabitants feel greater identity as part of a
defined constituency than as part of a purely arbitrary division reflecting the
result of mathematical exactitude. To this end the Court has made it clear that
an attempt may be made to have electoral districts coincide with political subdivisions. 9 However, this is not the same as a conscious effort to construct
districts such that the weight of a person's vote is dependent upon where he lives.
Even if it were true that an urban majority could place onerous terms upon a
suburban minority, such rationale offers no basis for permitting a minority of
voters with no discernible common interest to gain a disproportionate voice in
local government.
The principle of one man, one vote is a logical and desirable concomitant
to representative assembly in a democracy. No reason consistent with the ideals
of equality and majority rule appears to effectively refute the principle.2" As
stated in the Reynolds decision, the equal protection clause demands no less.21
Since Reynolds, the Court has consistently held that substantial equality is required. In Avery the Court concluded:
The Equal Protection Clause does not, of course, require that the State
never distinguish between citizens, but only that the distinctions that are
made not be arbitrary or invidious. The conclusion of Reynolds v. Sims was
that bases other than population were not acceptable grounds for distinguishing among citizens when determining the size of districts used to elect memThe fact is... that population factors must often to some degree be subordinated
in devising a legislative apportionment plan which is to achieve the important good
of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced representation of the regional, social, and
economic interests within a state....
18 Even without geographic districting it would be incongruous for a polity to begin the
preamble to its constitution with, "We the people.. ." and yet deny "the people" a voice in
the legislature by calling for interest representation. One who could not identify with an interest would be precluded from taking part in the formation of government policy.
19 See text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
20 For a discussion comparing the underlying values responsible for the reapportionment
decisions with those that militate against the decisions, see Auerbach, The Reapportionment
Cases: One Person, One Vote - One Vote, One Value, 1964 THE SUPREME CoURT REvI-w 1.
21 377 U.S. at 565.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER[

[February 1974]

bers of state legislatures. We hold today only that the Constitution permits
no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of
local government having general22governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.
Because the right to equal representation defines basic rules of the government
process, strict scrutiny of legislation affecting it has been the applicable judicial
standard of review. Under this review, exacting judicial examination of the
effect of any particular apportionment scheme and the legislature's rationale
therefor is made. The Reynolds Court stated that "[e]specially since the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of
2
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."
24
A more recent case, Kramer v. Union School District, although dealing
with voter qualifications rather than apportionment, is generally held to apply
to the voting rights area as a whole.25 There the Court stated that "the traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a 'rational
2 Thus, the state is given very
basis' for the distinctions [is] not... applicable."
little latitude and is forced to apply equal apportionment unless there exists a
2
compelling state interest that requires another type of voting. "

22

390 U.S. at 484-85.

23
24

377 U.S. at 562.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).

25 For a discussion of Kramer and its feared application in the equal protection area, see
Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School District,
15 ARiz. L. Rav. 457 (1973).
26 395 U.S. at 627-28.
27 Here it must be noted that throughout the voting rights cases a caveat is found which
holds that there may be some cases in which an election is for functionaries whose duties are
so far removed from normal government activities, and so disproportionately affect different
groups, that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds is not required. See, e.g., Hadley
v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1969). Until recently this appeared elusive for
Reynolds standards were implicitly applied to school districts (Kramer), to the issuance of
general obligation bonds (Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1971), and to the issuance
of public utility revenue bonds (Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)). However, in Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) and Associated Enterprises, Inc. v.
Toltec District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973) it was held that because of a water irrigation district's
limited purpose, and due to the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a
definable group, the statutes under attack do not violate the equal protection clause by limiting
the vote to district landowners and denying it to nonlandowner residents or by weighting the
votes according to the assessed valuation of the land.
It is clear from Salyer that where the caveat is met the Court will apply only a minimum
scrutiny test. It was stated that residents are "entitled to have their equal protection claim
assessed to determine whether the State's decision to deny the franchise to residents while
grantinz it to landowners was 'wholly irrelevant to achievements of the regulation's objectives.' "
410 U.S. at 730 quoting from Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). In
other words if a legislature may have a rational basis for a voting scheme, such will be upheld
by the courts upon a showing that the election involves activities far removed from normal
government functions and disproportionally affects different groups. In these cases the Court
found that the issue involved landowners as a definable group, and apparently that as the
amount of land one owns increases so does his interest. Therefore, the state may rationally
determine that those most interested ought to have control. The parameters of the caveat
beyond the facts of these two cases remain to be found. It is clear, however, that two factors
carried considerable weight. First of all, the purpose of the district (irrigation) was to serve
the land, and landowners only were directly involved. Secondly, funds for the service came
from landowners which were assessed on acres of land. Thus, others were not involved directly
in either the costs or the benefits of the district.
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III. Standards of Equal Apportionment Set
There is a need for an articulation of the standards necessary to achieve
"equal apportionment." Ideally, it would mean strictly one man, one vote. It
is readily apparent, however, that such a standard is not possible with today's
shifting populations. In Wesberry v. Sanders"s it was held that "as nearly as is
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's."29 The Reynolds Court announced that a state must make "an honest
and good faith effort to construct districts... as nearly of equal population as is
practicable."0 Thus, the same standards were set for all elections. In Swann v.
Adams3 ' the Supreme Court invalidated a Florida legislative apportionment plan
noting there was a failure to articulate acceptable reasons for the variations
among populations of the various legislative districts.-2 Thus, any deviation
requires justification. In Reynolds it was also made clear that:
In the apportionment of seats in a state legislature it is constitutionally
permissible to follow political subdivision lines in establishing legislative
districts so long as the resulting apportionment is one based substantially on
population
and the equal protection principle is not diluted in any significant
33
way.
It was clear that political subdivision lines were to be subordinate to the aim
of one man, one vote; and they were sacrificed in later decisions in order to obtain
among voting districts as small a variance in population as possible. In Kirkpatrick u. Preisler"' and Wells v. Rockefeller, 5 two later congressional district
cases, the Court applied the previously enunciated "as near as practicable"
standard. In Kirkpatrickthe Court stated that "the State must justify each variance, no matter how small," 6 and further held that "to accept population variances, large or small, in order to create districts with specific interest orientations
is antithetical to the basic premise of the constitutional command to provide
equal representation for equal numbers of people.""7 The Court here made clear
that the aim is for no variation in population among districts and that picking a
cutoff point at which population variances become de minimus is both arbitrary
and self-defeating."8 If a de minimus range is chosen, the objective would no
longer be zero deviation. Nevertheless, recent decisions of the Supreme Court
have expanded the meaning of equal apportionment to just such a range.
28 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added). It should be noted that in enunciating this principle the
court was interpreting Article I, § 2 of the Constitution which provides that representatives be
chosen "by the people of the several states."
30 377 U.S. at 577.
31 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
32 Id. at 443-44. It is doubtful that this plan with a variation of 30% among districts
would have withstood any test.
33 377 U.S. at 578.
34 394 U.S. 526 (1969). A variance of 6% was determined to be unconstitutionally large.
35 394 U.S. 542 (1969). A plan with a 13% variance was struck down.
36 394U.S. at 531.
37 Id. at 533.
38

Md. at 531.
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IV. An Erosion of Standards
In Abate v. Mundt 9 a plan was approved creating a county legislature with
districts corresponding to the county's five towns, one legislator being assigned
to the smallest town and the number of legislators for each other town computed
by multiplying the number of times each other town's population exceeded that
of the smallest. Although the plan was devised to preserve town-wide representation, and yet keep deviations from equal representation as small as possible, a
total voting inequality of 11.91% resulted." The decision conflicts with the language of Kirkpatrick and indicates the Court was developing a new definition
of equal apportionment for local governments separate from that of congressional elections. 4 ' In Abate the Court balanced the mandate for one man, one
vote against several factors. Among them was the history of close cooperation
between the county and constituent towns. This was coupled with the fact that
the same individuals occupied governing positions in the towns and the county
resulting in strong interdependence.42 Perhaps the most significant factor considered by the Court was "that the plan had no built-in bias tending to favor
particular political interests or geographic areas."4 In effect, Abate stands for
the rationale of preserving the integrity of existing political subdivisions as a
justification for deviance in voting equality. With this case equal apportionment
in local government becomes no longer a call to a one man, one vote standard
but a concept that evolves out of balancing whatever relevant factors come into
play against the one man, one vote concept. 4 In this case the relevant factors

39 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
40 Id. at 184.
41 Interestingly enough, in the term previous to that of Abate the Court stated in Hadley
v. Junior College District that "[i]t should be remembered .. .we are asked by voters to insure
that they are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm from unequal treatment is the same in any election regardless of the officials selected." 397 U.S. at 55.
42 403 U.S. at 186.
43 Id. at 187. The 'Court here was referring to Hadley, decided the previous year. There
an apportionment scheme for a junior college district was struck down because of a built-in
bias favoring smaller districts. Six trustees were to be elected, and if no subdistrict had
33 1/3% or more of total school age population of the total district then all were to be
elected at large; if one or more districts had between 33 1/3% and 50%, each such subdistrict would elect two trustees and the rest were to be elected at large from the remaining
subdistricts; if one had between 50% and 66 2/3% of school age population, it would elect
three trustees; and if a subdistrict had more than 66 2/3% it was to elect four trustees. 397
U.S. at 56-57. The voters of larger districts had their votes diluted unless they had exactly
33 1/3%, 50%, or 66 2/3% of the total enumeration. The Court held the scheme could not
be sustained because it did not sufficiently comply with the "as far as practicable" standard.
Id. at 57.
It would appear that a scheme wherein those districts having between 25% and 41 2/3%
of school-age population would elect two of six trustees, a district having between 41 2/3%
and 58 1/3% would elect three of six trustees and a district with over 58 1/3% would elect
four trustees may be constitutionally accepted under Mundt rationale because the scheme would
not discriminate. Nevertheless, to each voter the discrimination would be just as evident because any district not having exactly 33 1/3%, 50% or 66 2/3% would be malapportioned.
Thus, the Mundt rationale appears to ask simply if the discrimination is haphazard or systematic in scheme, not whether a voter's voice is diluted.
44 The Court stated there was no implication that "even these factors could justify substantially greater deviations [more than 11.9%] from population equality." 403 U.S. at 187.
However, in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), a deviation of 16.4% was upheld. See
text accompanying notes 46-54 infra.
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proved to be a history of close cooperation and "the need for intergovernmental
coordination [which] is often greatest at the local level." 4
In Abate the Court struck a new path in political theory for reapportionment cases. This holding, while explicitly compromising voter representation
and implicitly rejecting interest representation, institutes political entity representation.
The Supreme Court's most recent efforts in state voter apportionment include Mahan v. Howell4 6 The question here arose from statutes of the Virginia
General Assembly which apportioned districts for the purpose of electing members to the House of Delegates. They were attacked as violative of the equal
protection clause due to an impermissible population variance among the districts. The Court held a 16.4% variance to be within constitutional boundaries
where the divergences were based upon "legitimate considerations incident to
the effectuation of a rational state policy." 7 The large variance resulted from
the state using political subdivision lines for voter districting. The Court took
notice of the fact that the state legislature had the power to enact local legislation,
and found it rational for the electoral districts to follow political subdivision lines
for it facilitated enactment of legislation affecting single communities." Therefore, it was concluded that since the apportionment plan was consistent with
a valid state policy,4 the variance was permissible. The Court was evidently
building upon the Abate decision, and much of the rationale in Mahan applies
to local governments as well as state legislatures. A narrow interpretation of the
case may limit its applicability in metropolitan government.
Although the expansion of standards would make consolidation more attractive to suburbs by permitting them to have greater voice, important considerations
of this decision must be noted. Since it appears that districts must reasonably
follow political boundaries if the policy is to accomplish subdivision representation, where there is great disparity in populations the policy could not be given
effect without emasculating equal apportionment altogether. Also, combining
areas haphazardly to achieve a semblance of equality would be inconsistent with
the policy of political subdivision representation and thus be suspect. Furthermore, as made clear in Abate, a blatant effort to favor particular geographical
or political interests would cause the apportionment plan to fail. Finally, the
basis for the state policy in Mahan (subdivision representation so that local legislation could be effected more efficiently) is the antithesis of the rationale for
consolidated local governments. Consolidation loses purpose if parochialism is

45 403 U.S. at 186.
46 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
47 410 U.S. at 325. It is interesting to note that the district court found that by using a
computation method previously approved by the Supreme Court in Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S.
120, 124 (1967), one district was overrepresented to such an extent that the actual variance
was 23.6%. 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971). Under the state method, however, the
lower deviation was found. The district court held that it did not make any difference which
calculation was used, that neither variance was acceptable. Id. at 1139-40, n.1. The Supreme
Court declined "to enter this imbroglio of mathematical manipulation" and used the lower
variance figure. 410 U.S. at 319 n.6. See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Id. at 336, 337.
48 Id. at 325-26.
49 Id. at 328.
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insured. There is a substantial difference between assuring those in suburban
areas that their votes will be worthwhile and a conscious effort to maintain
parochial division in local government. The objective of consolidation is to
develop relevant substantive programs designed to deal with metropolitan problems through a realization of local as well as metropolitan needs. Local government ought not be a vehicle by which community leaders can protect their interests. 50
More importantly, the Court explicitly stated in Mahan that there are two
different standards for equal apportionment: (1) strict mathematical equality
standard for apportionment of congressional districts, and (2) rational state
policy standard for state and local apportionment. The reason given by the
Court for different tests was that application of the stricter standard "may impair
the normal functioning of state and local government."'" The standard for these
governmental entities is still substantial equality; however, it is expanded to
take into account a rational state policy that may cause deviations in the one
man, one vote standard. It is clear that where the Court uses the criterion of
"rational state policy," the minimum scrutiny applied in other equal protection
contexts is to be applied in this area as well, so long as the variance is within an
allowable range.52 However, substantially equal voting is still a fundamental
right protected by the compelling state interest test. The Court stated that "...
a State's policy urged in justification of disparity in district population, however
rational, cannot constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of substantial equality."5 3 Nevertheless, it appears that a state will have little difficulty
in obtaining approval for malapportioned districts within an allowable variance
(at least 161%) as long as some policy can be shown, and the apportionment is
consistent with that policy.54
Finally, two cases handed down by the Court in June of 1973 adopted a
de ninimus standard by which equal apportionment can be met for state and
local elections. In Gaffney v. Cummings" and White v. Regester 8 it was held
that variations reaching 7.9% and 9.9% respectively are permissible without the
requirement of a rational state policy to bolster them. The Court reiterated
statements made in previous cases: that the equal protection clause requires
districts as nearly of equal population as possible; that a state must make an
honest and good faith effort to construct legislative districts as nearly of equal

50 See note I supra. Also, it must be noted that Abate was an irregular situation in this
area. Rather than there being a history of cooperation in most metropolitan areas, consolidation is sought because local bodies are unable to work together.
51 410 U.S. at 323. The Court made it dear that the Article I, § 2 constitutional mandate
for congressional elections is a stricter standard than that which is to be applied to the states
under the equal protection clause.
52 The Court stated, "We are not prepared to say that the decision of the people of
Virginia to grant the General Assembly the power to enact local legislation dealing with political subdivisions is irrational." Id. at 325-26.
53 Id. at 326.
54 See Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIz. L. R.v. 479
(1973), for a critique of the double standard of judicial review in application of equal protection depending upon whether or not a fundamental right is involved.

55 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
56

412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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population as practicable; 57 and that an individual's right to vote is unconstitutionally impaired when his or her right is in a substantial fashion diluted
compared to the vote of citizens living in other parts of the state. 8 In both cases,
however, the Court basically held that "minor deviations" from mathematical
equality of population among state legislative districts are insufficient to make
out a prima fade case of discrimination under the equal protection clause, and
therefore, no justification is required of the state.5" In Gaffney, the Court recognized the purpose of the districting was to achieve statewide political party
equality. It responded by stating that "[fit would be idle ... to contend that
any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment
plan would be sufficient to invalidate it." 60 Although the state in White was unable to offer any "acceptable justification" for a 9.9% variance, the apportionment was upheld based upon Gaffney.6 ' It was noted, however, that larger
differences between districts very likely would not be tolerable without justification based upon a rational state policy. 2 These cases present a considerable
mutation from the one man, one vote rule in Reynolds. Although other decisions
indicated that digressions from the standard were possible, such digressions had
to be accompanied by a rational justification. Now it is indicated that a state
need not justify every variance among state voting districts. Deviations below
10% are simply constitutionally insignificant.
It is interesting to note that in Gaffney the Court based its rationale partly
upon the fact that many apportionment plans were submitted by various bodies.
Each was an attempt to achieve smaller variance based upon a census that itself
is accurate for only an instant and very questionable over a ten-year period."
In reflecting upon the Reynolds holding, the Court stated:
This is a vital and worthy goal, but surely its attainment does not in any
commonsense way depend upon eliminating the insignificant population
variations involved in this case .... [Ijt is apparent that such representation
does not depend solely on mathematical exactitude among district populations.6 4
The rationale loses persuasion when it is seen that in a congressional districting
case handed down by the Court the same day, three different districting plans
were reviewed and it was held that a deviation of 4.1% was unacceptable where
another plan existed that limited variations to .16%.5 Furthermore, though the
Court shows a disdain for the exact numbers approach, it implicitly relies upon

57 412 U.S. at 743.
58 Id. at 744.
59 Id. at 751.
60 Id. at 752.
61 412 U.S. at 764. "We cannot glean any equal protection violation from the single fact
that two legislative districts in Texas differ frpm one another by as much as 9.9% when compared with the ideal district." Id.
62 Id.
63 412 U.S. at 745. The population of a district is just not that knowable to be used for
such refined judgments.
64 Id. at 748-49.
65 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973).
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a fixed percentage when it decides what values are to be de mrnimus. When
considered against Hadley v. Junior College District," where the Court held an
apportionment plan invalid because it appeared to discriminate against a definable group, the de minimus concept becomes even more questionable. If the
Court were to find a 10% variance between all urban and rural areas, it would
find discrimination and based upon Hadley demand reapportionment. However,
if the same malapportionment were to be found haphazardly distributed, it would
be upheld. In such an instance the Court actually substitutes equal protection
for perceived geographical interests in place of that of voters. The question should
not be whether an area has its voting strength diluted, but whether voters as
individuals have their votes diluted.
V. The Present Status of Reapportionment
It is clear now that substantial equality can be satisfied by different methods
in state and local government apportionment. If the variance among districts is
less than 10%, a prima fade case of substantial equality is established." If the
state or local government can show a rational basis for its districting scheme, at
least a 17% variance will be upheld. Plans with a variance much greater than
17% will probably fail to pass the substantial equality test. The major development in recent cases is that no longer does districting have to meet the one
man, one vote test, but rather a wide margin of error is afforded.6 Mr. Justice
Marshall noted in his dissent in White that between 1969 and 1973 the range
of variances among state legislatures had been cut dramatically. Prior to 1969,
variances of over 15% could be found in more than 44 state legislatures. By
1973, in almost one half of the states, the total variance of senatorial and house
districts was found to be very near or below 5 %.9 He predicts that such gains
will be lost by these decisions."
A question that remains to be answered is why the Supreme Court has
qualified itself on the one man, one vote concept. Certainly the change in the
Court's makeup has had an effect. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black both
voted consistently for the one man, one vote rule. The newer members view
reapportionment differently and a contrasting majority has formed. Primarily,
the Court is responding to the many critics of the rule.' A discussion of the
criticisms cast at the one man, one vote rule will show them to be largely without
merit in the local government context.

66 397 J.S. 50 (1970).
67 The figure of 10% is used here because in White it was noted that the 11.9% variance
of Mundt required a rational state policy. 412 U.S. at 762.
68 See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in White at 779.
69 Id. at 70.
70 Id. at 781.
71 Mr. Justice White, in Gaffney v. Cummings, commented on the problems of the one
man, one vote concept and directed the reader to a publication of essays discussing the problems. 412 U.S. at 749 n.15.
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VI. Criticisms of One Man, One Vote Rule
A. An Ineffective Force for Policy Change
There may be some truth to the claim that the amount of apportionment
litigation has been great because any voter feeling cheated can bring an equal
protection claim if there is a variance. Nevertheless, one must seriously question
such an argument. Although the volume of litigation has been high, to compromise a constitutional protection merely to reduce it is unduly pragmatic.
Professor Bickel has made it dear that he favors interest and group representation consideration in apportionment schemes as advocated by Justices HarIan and Stewart. 2 Additionally, he claims that the reapportionment decisions
have produced no discernible change in political power and that no new major73
ity has appeared that has made more democratic the system of government.
Other writers who agree with Professor Bickel feel that the crucial question
in apportionment is whether one man, one vote makes any difference in political
policy output. They look at the policy decisions of legislatures whose members
are elected on a one man, one vote basis. They then carefully compare those
policies with those of legislatures based upon malapportioned constituencies.
Most have found no discernible difference, 4 and the claim arises that since the
concept has no effect upon output, it is inconsequential and ineffective in our
political scheme. These findings may be true, though there are those who dispute them.7 5 Nevertheless, the corollary that one man, one vote is of no use does
not necessarily follow. The value of equal apportionment is realized in another
equally important context. It should be viewed not as having the purpose of
affecting policy output, but as an expression of belief in our political system.
Elections are meaningful to those who vote. It is a matter of political efficacy
and institutional ideals. In a sense the form itself becomes the overruling influential value. The Supreme Court decisions should be viewed from such a perspective. The premise upon which our political system in the United States is
built is that people can effect change. The ritual of representative government
has much significance. No one doubts that interests and groups have an important impact on output through lobbying. The individual, however, has only
one link with government policy. To undermine that link is to take away any
political efficacy he may have. If there is any right that the Constitution ought
to protect, it is the voting right. Since the equal protection clause mandates that
people situated alike are to be treated alike and since there is no more important
event in the political process to the individual than voting, each person's vote
ought to be weighted equally.

72 Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONINMENT IN THE 1970's,
57, 72 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
73 Id. at 58.
74 See Bickel, The Effects of Malapportionment in the States-A Mistrial, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's, 151, 151-54 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
75 See Bickel, note 74 supra.
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B. Complication to Regional Government

An argument made by others, including Professor Dixon, is that by equalizing population in voting districts the Court is putting a "constitutional complication" in the quest for regional governments. These writers claim that only
by affording some constituents extra voting power can they be induced to join
with others for mutual advantage. It is thought that without granting such an
advantage, broad local governments will be unable to acquire area-wide cooperation."6 Although it may be true that urban leaders are willing to trade the weight
of their constituents' votes for consolidation with the suburbs, it is also true that
those in the urban areas cannot be denied equal protection of the law. Equal
protection is a personal right applying to individuals. It is a guarantee that
each person will be treated equally with other persons. Neither groups nor interests are guaranteed such a right. The court, in mandating equal apportionment, confirmed a fundamental principle of political organization that is valid
regardless of the results produced. When equal voting is compromised so is the
entire system. Thus equal apportionment cannot be said to be a constitutional
complication, but rather it is a given-a basis from which localities must work
in designing election schemes. Although it may be an impediment to minority
control, it is not a vehicle by which majorities will necessarily impose onerous
terms on a minority. Few would maintain that the smaller number should have
the most effective voice; rather it is a desire that the minority not be imposed
upon. Such can be accomplished within the one man, one vote concept. The
problem lies not with constitutional protections, but in the inability of conventional election machinery to transfer voting strength into representative strength.
In most local elections the candidate who wins the highest number of votes
"takes all." Those who support another candidate find themselves without representation even though their numbers may be substantial.
C. A License to Gerrymander

Another problem that has always been evidenced in the United States,
gerrymandering, is said to have increased lately as a result of the reapportioument
decisions. The argument is that when redistricting is done on a grand scale and
those doing the redistricting have only to assure the courts that the districts are
contiguous and have equal population, the potential for shaping districts so
that they are most favorable to those doing the districting is maximized. Therefore, it is said, the Court should permit other factors to be considered in reapportionment." Although these arguments may be accurate, it seems difficult to
understand how returning to political boundary lines as the basis for districting
will result in a correction of gerrymandering. Certainly it is not a new concept
that only recently has reared its ugly head. One way or another, it is not necessary to make a choice between one man, one vote, and all the evils that appear
76

Dixon, The Court, The People and "One Man, One Vote" in REAPPORTIONMENT IN

THE 1970's 7 (N. Polsby ed. 1971). See also Bickel, note 72 supra.
77 See Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next judicial Target?, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 121 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
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to result from massive reapportionment. In local government there are effective
alternatives to the single-member, winner-takes-all election scheme.
VIII. Effective Alternatives
In Dusch v. Davs7 the Supreme Court upheld a viable solution to the
dilemma Professor Dixon fears. A Virginia Beach consolidation plan was upheld under which the city's eleven councilmen were elected at large, but at
least one of the councilmen was required to reside in each of the seven boroughs.
The boroughs were varied in makeup with three being urban, three being rural,
and one being tourist. 79 Under this type of plan the one man, one vote mandate
is preserved, for each vote is weighted equally; yet the residency requirement
asspres representation of any regional interests. Each community is given a
voice in the area government, thus providing each voter with someone who is
"his" representative. Since political strength would emanate from the area
where he makes his home, each representative would necessarily be favorable
to those within his community. Nevertheless, he would have to have metropolitan interests amenable to a majority of all the voters. Thus, to a great extent
parochialism as a problem in metropolitan government is overcome because
particular geographical issues, whether urban or suburban, would be presented
in an accommodating manner. At the same time, voter efficacy and community
identity are maintained. Although this plan would be successful where there are
thought to be regional interests, it would be a threat to any minority not solidified
in an area. That defect, however, goes to the institution of winner-takes-all
elections, which are widely used in the United States, not to any defect in this
scheme. In any event, the usual problem of inability of regional minorities to
gain representation which is inherent in at-large districting is solved here."° In
effect, this plan would produce an atmosphere of cooperation among the communities in an area and thus be conducive to area planning.
Other modifications to at-large voting in local governments can insure
representation of minorities. Pennsylvania has instituted one such modification
by using limited voting in its elections for county commissioners. Three commissioners are elected at large for each county; however, each voter casts a ballot
for only two of the three candidates. 1 Under this scheme each person has the
same voting strength, therefore the equal protection clause is satisfied.'
The
scheme encourages a fairer representation than would otherwise result, for any
substantial minority, whether or not geographically solidified, is guaranteed a
representative.
Cumulative voting, the inverse of limited voting, is used in the Illinois house
elections. 3 In cumulative voting each elector has as many votes as there are
78 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
79 Id. at 113.
80 The scope of this note does not include the problems incurred in an unmodified at large
election district. For a good discussion of the inherent defects see Washington, Does the Constitution Guarantee Fair and Effective Representation to all Interest Groups Making Up the
Electorate, 17 How. L.J. 91 (1971).
81 PA. STAT. AiN. tit. 16 § 501 (1956).

82 Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
83 ILL. Rv.STAT., ch. 46, § 17-13 (1971).
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representatives to be elected from the area at large, and he may cast his votes in
any combination for the candidates on the slate. If there are three candidates
to be elected, the voter may cast all three votes for one candidate, or give one
candidate two votes and give another candidate one vote, or give one vote to
each of three candidates. The three candidates with the highest number of
votes are the winners.
Both schemes achieve substantially similar results. With limited voting,
however, almost any minority can achieve representation if there are only two
definable groups, for there is no way the majority can split its votes without
seriously jeopardizing the election of its candidates. If a group were to run a
number of candidates greater than the number of votes each individual may cast,
the probability is great that the people would spread their votes out over those
candidates. Thus, the total number of votes received by each candidate would
be diminished, permitting a minority supporting fewer candidates to amass more
votes. The practical results are that each group runs as many candidates as
each elector has votes. The largest group elects its candidates and the second
largest elects the rest. A third group finds it very difficult to gain representation
unless all three groups are of approximately equal weight. In this manner
limited voting is one step improved over at-large voting where each is afforded
the same number of votes as there are persons to be elected. Cumulative voting
goes even farther. It is more responsive to a greater number of representatives.
Where there are several positions to be filled minority groups can easily achieve
a voice by running only a few candidates (or only one) and then voting in
blocs. In this manner cumulative voting becomes very much like proportional
representation.
Both plans insure that if at least two interest groups identify with candidates
and can be mobilized, each will be represented. A majority group never loses
control, but also never gains the sole voice in metropolitan politics. Furthermore,
no matter how a minority is distributed geographically, it is still afforded a
voice. Nevertheless, a geographical representative is not insured. This becomes
a negative factor in consolidation plans if voters perceive a need for a community
representative. Even so, if there is a significant geographical interest, it will be
represented. An advantage with these two schemes is that voters themselves will
select which values are most important to them. Furthermore, those communities
with a similar point of view can coalesce and elect a candidate with their collective point of view whether the similar interest areas encircle the urban center
or cover a more compact area.
IX. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in the reapportionment cases of the 1960's applied the
proper constitutional protection afforded individuals by the fourteenth amendment. More recent decisions indicate a trend away from the one man, one
vote standard within the state and local government context. This is largely in
response to several arguments that the concept is not "workable," especially in
metropolitan areas. This note has shown that any impediments a strict equal
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apportionment standard appears to place in the way of metropolitan consolidation can easily be overcome by employing election schemes not commonly used
in the United States' political framework. Hence, there is no need for the Court
to compromise the efficacy of the individual and the election framework as a
whole in the name of political expediency. If local government is a viable part
of .representative democracy, then equal voting should mean the same thing in
local elections as it does in congressional elections. Each person has as much
right to a full and fair representation in local government as he does in Congress.
Reynolds mandated that apportionment plans be devised with population as
the controlling factor rather than geography or interests for the simple reason
that neither interests nor acres vote, nor are they guaranteed equal protection
by the fourteenth amendment. There is no adequate reason why a citizen's
voting power should depend either upon the district in which he lives or upon
the type of election in which he votes. Presently the Court is sanctioning just
such a result. To devise a plan with a primary objective of maintaining political
subdivisions and secondarily to equalize population differences abuses the equality to be afforded each individual; and when it is done without necessity, it
becomes invidious.
Timothy W. Silbaugh

